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THE SOUTHERN FLANK
any cnda,ngcrcd point within n few hours.
From all sides, tn,Ilks would roll toward
the threatt-ned coast. and trains and trucks
would move up new CermHn divitiions.
We should like to state here tha.t we
oppo.· the idea of considering Europe a
"f rtr '." The term "fortre. s" implies
a v ry limited area, which leave no free-
dom 'of movement to the defender and
Jn di cussing here in sHch detail the
deliberations of the Allied conulla.nd and
tho pas ibilities of an inva:;ioll of Europe
from the south, we do not wish to creato
tho imprc sion that tho Axis iti limited to
the Jefenl'ivc. This i.' not the case.
The A-"i' is free to decide how it wishes
to employ its southern fil\,nk. Thus, for
in tanee, the strong position of the Axis
in the eastern Mediterranean I\,nd its
possibility of advancing viI\, Cyprus
a lYa,i11st Syria are cau:ing the Allies
anxi ty a,nd forcing them to take counter-
men ure·.
* * *
restri 'ts him to using up his stores of
ammuwtwn and food. Howevcr the
parts of Europe under .Axis control (i.e.,
exclmling the British Isles. Sweden, Spain,
Purtugal, Switzerlancl, and Turkey) covel'
somc 4,;100,000 squam kilometer.. that i:-,
ten times the size of Uerman v in 1H37.
Hem the Axis pOR esscs ma.n·y million:-
of experien 'ed soldiers and, as a rcport
from Berlin stated a few days ago, an
army of about 150 million male and
femZtle workcrH. Here there arc tens of
thouH<Lnds of factories working. Hcre is a
close-meshed, cfficient network of rail-
way:>, illataI' roads, and waterways. Hcro
from month to month the ideal of a ncw 7
united Europe is being consolidated.
This Europe is not a fortrcss bllt a.
fighting and working eontiJlC'nt. What it
means to fight this continent on it::: own
soil has been expC'riellcC'd by thc huge
armies of the SovietCnion during the
last two years and would also be eli -
covered hy the British and AIllerican
troops if they should try to attack it.
A CHANGE IN METHODS
By A. V. DERINGER
E:JJactly two years ago, alcng the German. oviet border. the lcrge.•t land
war in history began. Th4 issue was BolJJhevis/II, which had made the Bussia1.
p~le it~ tool a.nd throw1l a dangerous net over the world. In our art·icle .. The
Red Road" (November 1942) we analyzed the fir8t siz plw./Ie8 of the hi8tory of
tM GominUnl (Gomrmmist IlIter1latimwl) up to that time. The recent l,jquidation
of the Gominte"11 has opened a new pha8e. one which requires e:ca.mining. '1'hi.•
has been done by A. V. Deringer. an ea'pert with year8 of e:rpe,.iencc in the
IItn/{1(/le agai1l<9t World Bol8hevism. wll{) presenJ.s his v'iew.. 011 three important
gue.•I'jon.,,: the attitude of Bo[••hem:;rm and the Gomi'11tern toward war in general .. thcir
aUitude toward Ihe pre8e1lt war .. and finally, the so·called dill80h-ing of the G'omilltent.
-,K.M.
THE /111al aim of Bolshevism is WorldRevolution. This has been frankly
said by its leaders many times (we
quote one of many statements to this
effect at tho end of thi article). The
hort Cllt, if not the prerequisite, of
World Revolution i war. Itsolf bom
out of the chao of the Great War,
Bolshevism has always boped to benefit,
if not suecoed in reaching its goal, by a
new war. And the bigger that war the
better. "In the ea e of a world war the
World Revolution will break out sooner.
No one will then sllcceed in stopping the
spring torrent of revolution," wrote the
main organ of the Comintern, the K01n-
munistitche ky International in its issue
No.5 of 1£139.
\Var was the means by which it was
hopcd to break up the "bourgeois-
capitalistic" world and to creato a. "rev-
olutionary atmosphere." \Var was the
outstanding issue in the minds of Bol-
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Bhevist leaders. This was, for example,
clearly stated at the Sixth World Con-
gress of the Comintern. in 192R (VoL I.
p.600, of the stenographic report): "AJI
other problems am subordinatod to the
central pl"Oblcm . . . , the problem of
war .... The Communists llluSt strain
every offort toward preparing thomselves
for the solution of this practical que ·tion."
Thus Bolshevism is in truth, I1A Lenin
once stated in t\ solemn speech, "a war
which we haye declared 011 the whole
world."
WARS AND WARS
However not overy war was welcome
to Bolshevi·m. The ideal war for Moscow
was what it likes to call an "im perialistic
war." i.e., a war between soveral bourgeois
or "Fascist" statos without participation
of the 'oviot Union. n. war in which non-
Bolshevist states weaken each othor,
thereby promoting tho above-mentioned
"revolutionary atmosphere" within them-
selves.
But another typo of war-in Moscow's
terminology a "war of intervention against
the USi:.'H,'·-was the constant nightmare
of tho Bolsheviks.
The spcechc , re.olutions, and writings
of tho Third lntorrmt.ional show ·Iearlv
that tho Krpmlin always rcgardod such "a
war as inevitable. "They [i.e., the capi-
talistic st,ates] are systematically pre-
paring for it. Thoy are pro paring for it
with (' vory pos iblc mean., They are
preparing fot' it at e\' ry hour.' These
are tho norvous closing wot"ds of the
"Manifesto of the I'ixth World Congress
of the Comintern to all the workers of
tho world, to all peasants, to aU sup-
pressed colonial people. , to all the soldiers
nnd sailors of the cltpitalistic armies and
nilvie... "
Moscow courted the, ympathy of foreign
worker uno }>(\/I,'1ltlltl'i, not only in tit
sense tlmt it nocckd thiR sympathy in order
to provont n. war of intenrcntion, but also
in the reverse selll'ie: the Comintern ha
fostered the Dlyth of the war of inter-
vention in order to conquer the ympathy
of th foreign labor clltsses.
At the Fifteenth Congress of the Com-
munist Party of tho Soviet Union, Stalin
said:
\\'0 must not forget I.enin's words that. 88
regards our dovelopment, much depends on whether
wo >llndl slIc·ce·d in postponing the inovitablo war
with tho cu"it.nlistic world. This WIll' (·,u, be
pOllt,ponod oith r until th prolet.llriun ro,'olution
hf\8 mstured in Europe, or until the outbl't"'uk of
u rovolution in the coloni , or also wnil th
moment when th capit.alillt8 start a wor ugaill5t
onch othor oV'r tho p.utition of the coloni08.
The political changes in Germany in
19:33, a.'l well as the conclusion of the
Anti-Comintern Pact, were regarded as
scrious omcns of approaching decisions.
The resolution of tho Thirteenth Plenary
Meeting of the Executive Committee of
the Comintel'l1 contain the words: "This
war must come, soon 'I' or later."
Its natuI'o is revealed to 1If' by one
Triandalov in his pll blication 'J'he Aims
and Tnsk.~ oj the Sm'iet State, which
appeared in the series 'Instructions for
Political ('ommis. aI's in Wartime" (Mo.-
cow, 19:35):
The war of tho Communist Stat-,a IlKIlinst any
capitali tic SilLtc wllIuever will be of Ii closs·
rovolution.U')' nature.
"FIRST TIME ~ TIfE m'TORY OF WAR"
This is not tho pIttee to Rtudy the
methoos by which the Rt-o Army pre-
pared it!< forces for this wa,r. JnstC'ad,
we shall follow anot h('r line of preparation
which waR carried 011 outside the purely
military sphere.
In the book On c:uard Jor OILr Country
by Rabinovitch (~loscow, 193ti. p.170)
we find tho following quotation hy Stalin:
The bOl.lrgooi~io can UO iLHSlIl'ed that ill tho ('IJ.He
of war our IlUnlerOlli! frionds, Jistribllwd .. II u\'cr
til(' world. will ILl UH'k its ....." Ilnd holp to comploLO
the \'ictor)' of the Hod Arm~'.
In tho October 1934 issue of the larg
Moscow periodical l'oina i RevoZnf8ia" in
nn article on "The Nature of the Fut.uro
\\Tar" hy Amigarov the function, of
these "numerous friend " are explained
more clearly:
A war of tho capitalistic states fL~l\in8t the
U 'SR will imp080 upon the intorlll\tiolllli pro,
lotariat. chi 'f1~' i he la ·conscious pllrt of tho
h,borers of t.ho.' state that oro waJ(ing war upon
1J1l. tho flln ·t.i n of a Il\nding corp of the Hed
Army, a Ilulding corps de-tined to bronk lip ollr
opponent~ from within. III the l,i.story of wl\r
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"his will be the fil"!\t case in which one of the bel·
ligerent pOWel"il has in nil countries of tho world,
evon the hostilo OliOS, hllnd"ods of t.hollRantls of
supporters organized in tho Commuui~t Party.
"ROW DO YOU KNOW THAT, COMnADE~"
What distinguishes the Soviet theory
of strategy is the plan to correlate the
actions of the Red Army at tho front
with the organizing of armed uprisings
and of civil war behind the back of the
opponent, at his rear and in his own
country. Before the present war a high
Soviet officer once stated:
Tho futUJ,e war will be lost by that country in
which armed mass uprisings take placo first.
Those revolts will tako placo first in tho roar of
those armies which are in retreat. For that mason
the Red Army must always be on the ofIensivo.
The achievement of these political goals
is too closely connected with purely
military problems for it to be dea.lt with
quite separately. Hence the Red Army,
especially its political leaders and the
officers' corps, was exhaustively trained
for all problems arising from the employ-
ment of troops in the enemy's rear or on
nemy soil. This training was not limited
to purely military a poct : it was also
extended to fields which no other army
in the world includes in this way in the
sphere of military training.
This training was well organized and
carried out under the supervision of a
specially qualified teaching staff. The
major part of those teachers had been
prepared by spending many years abroad,
80 that each man knew every detail of
the countPy to which he was assigned.
After a general survey of the geo-
,graphical and ethnographical aspects of
the country in question, there followed a
detailed study uf its domestic political
situation. The subjects included: social
tension, the attitude of national minorities
toward the state, religious conflicts, etc.
All these questions were not dealt with
according to a fixed pattern or in passing,
but traced to their very roots, so that the
leaders of the Red Army who were thus
trained would, even under changed con-
<litions, be enabled to make their own
<lecisions. And special attention was
devoted to the possibilities of exploiting
any E'ympathy for the Soviet Union that
might arise among cert,ain circles or
sections of the people under every imagi-
nable political constellation. Of course,
particular attention was paid to the re-
lationship between its officers and men.
"How do you know all that, ('onnade?"
was once the question asked by amazed
Red ofneers when their in .. tructor told
them Rome astounding c1ctailR about tho
internal eventR in a neighboring country.
With an ironical snllie, the instructor
answered' "We know the names, the
family affairs. and all details about the
personal anairs of every single Polish
otficer from the rank of colonel upward."
Even though this ob. ervation may Recm
ill itseli unimportant, it is nevertheless
characteristie of the manner ill which
this ''lork was carried on.
vVhen one asks as to the source from
which the High Command of the Rod
Army is able to obtain such informat,ion
regarding the intornal afhirR of foreign
countries, one must bear ill mind the
close contact existing butwcell tho lea.dt·r;;
of the Soviet Union and the Communist
Parties throughout thc world. Bt'sides
the actual Communist Parties, numerous
associations and organizations all over the
world-whether pnrely Communistic,
semi-Communistic, or belonging to tho
so-called Popular Front-were, in one
way or another, invisibly included in the
vast network coUecting news and in-
formation for the Soviet Union. And
this was done under such l'ikillful camou-
flage that to this day the world kllOws
sUl'prisingly little about it.
AID FROM THg EN EM Y
In order not to be politically isolated
in this inevit.able conHict ,,-it.h the 1'0 t
of the world, Moscow strained every effort
to find allies. This spemed a bold and
difficult undertaking aft.er having at first
hurled open challenges at the whule world
and after having declared every country
to be an enemy of the USSR.
··It is no Utopian scheme to force our
enemics to help liS in a very definite
manner," the la.te Kl'llssin once stated at
a l';lrty Congress. Such a policy, he
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Franco
England
Canada ..
ClIl",
lIlexif'o "
~ ·witz.crlnud
l)('lIrnarl<
l'SA
continued, "must be ba ed on empbasi7Jng
tho contrast' in the en Illy cum p, ill
tilTing up ~reed, in incit.in~ our enemi s
against each uthcr; amI all t,hi on an
international Bca.le a.s well u.s within the
border of each country."
I 'ome corices. ion!", mostlv of a uper-
fi ·ial nature, whi h had ·t.o bo mad ,
h rdly affected the Comintern. After
all, aile of its most important rules says
tlmt its IVeltanscl/(l,!t'llny and tho progntm
of the Communi t Party 0.1'0 dogmatie,
wher as, in tho ca.:~e of its strategy amI.
tactic, there is no dogma but 'olely what
'or've' the tnrggle.
Now bogan It tireless, all-embracing
propagandt~ in the democmtie countrios
which was not without 'uccoss. In
ll'Tal'ch I n;1fJ at the Eighte 'nth Congrc ..
of tho Communi t Party of the LTSSH,
l\lanuil ky, th· Secretary of tho Comintern
and a momb l' of its Exocutive Com-
mittee, announced the following figures
on the growth of the Party during tho
preceding five year (Pra 1(la, 11.3.39) :
193'J 1939
40,000 270,000
U,OOO ) 8,000
8,000 ltl,ooO
3.000 23,000
2.000 30,000
Il,OOO ) 9,000
:1.000 90,000
20,000 90,000
At that time, the total nllmber of
rogistered mom bel'S of tho Cornintern
throughout tho world, lIot including tho
U 'SH amollnted to 1,200,000. During
the a me period the mem h 'I' Lip of tho
Communist y uth orgm1izl~tions out ide
of th U •'R. rose from 110,000 to 746,000.
Thus in 10:Hl the Comintol'l1 had roughly
two rnillion registered supporters outside
of RUBSia. In addition to this, it.: direct
influence al'u extended over four million
members of Communist labor union'.
For the carrying out of its action ,
the (;ornintern could dispo 0, in addition
to its OWII .I'arty orgI1ni1.a.tion::;, over
numorous othcr partics I~nd groups in
the democrnt.ic cOlmtl'ies. As in tho
case of the Popular Front Il.8 uch tho
entiro activity in these countries was for
Moscow not 1111 end but only a means.
Tho real aim wa to harm or if possible,
o\'en destroy those state which, as a
matter of principle, wero ho tile to Com-
munism and later openly admitted their
ideologica.l opposition in tho Anti-Camin-
t(rn Pact.
\Yhile the Comintern thus worked at
it world-wido network, tho 'o\'i t Unioll
was feveri hly developed into tho "Basis
of World Rev llltion" with its armament
industry and Red Arn1Y. At th Seventh
Congress (l9:H;), Stalin was alroady ablo
to show the 'omrnW1i~ts of all the world
quite a fajr llppllmt.us for suhj(·cting tho
world by Commwli"m.
A NJ':W SITUATJO~ AHISt:;::;
The completo change ill t.ho political
situa.tion of the world Il.l'i~illg from the
!:<igning of the G rman- 'ovict Treaty of
August I fl39 a ' ....eLl as from the outbreak
of the war in Europe WlLS quiekly taken
into considoration by tho Comintern.
• ome indications as to how this was dono
are offered by the German Government's
note declaring war on the oviet Union.
It contains the following passage:
Contrary to all obligatiolls MSUO) d and in groM
violation of solemn de laratiolls ... attempt'" ut
subverb;ve actiolls have been not ollly continuod.
hut ovon illf'rousoel. Soon after tho (:on ,)tIBion of
tho tn'My, tho Comintem r08um<><! i(s L\ctivitioll ill
nil fields. III order not to trnn"gr tho trcutic.'J
openly, only tho llic/hods wero (·I ..lll/zed und thu
eUlllOlltlago ('arrioel out with more (lr 1.lI1d cunnin .
:Further deta-ils aro contain d in the
roport of Lho Corman Mini. try of tho
Interior in tho Pirst DOCllments Concerning
the Erents Leading to the OemULn-Soviet
!rar:
In the Rr (L" occupioel by C nnany there w<rO
till somo romnant, of th forllll'r Corulllulli l>
orguniza( ion", which greatly fa ilitt,tcd the work
of the Cominwrn there. ConH,"n~ observatiun
"howed t'mt tho Ilg 'Ilciell of thu C'cornintern in tho
EllropelUl COUIII rics wero aguin being greatly
cnlu.rged .... Thus there il$ " main ugency ill
HtOf'kholm. This is 0110 of Iho m08t active IUHJ
dlll1gorous C -nt l'll of the Cornintern. Commwlist
funct ionarie>t aro employed h..TO who havo ro-
('eived yearH of tmining ill }108COW .... Uy
skillfully workod Ollt courier routo". materiRI. orelcl'll,
11IIti funds wero constant Iv obtuillod from (he Co",·
int'rn ins! rlletors in Stocl<Jlolrn and Copenhagon.
Thi activity WIUI haded by thu ruprcsentativu of
t hI:' European bureau of the Corninlcrn in St.o<>k.
holm. UIC Communist m tnl r f the Swedish
J:>arlillment Lindroth .... Communist fun tionar.
il:'s from the Protectorate [Connerly (',l.t'oho lovakiu]
regularly viaited the Lenill Schoul in Moscow
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during the 16 I. fow yeurs. where they received a
military-polit ic;d t mining in the theory and prnetice
of civil war and t,errori~rn. 'fl." agent for this was
the Toss correspondent Kurt Ucer. ]n addition
to this there was also a direct wireless cOlUlCetioll
with the Cornintllrll ill Moscow _ ...
Besides the ship-!>Ubotop:e groups formed by
England by tho order of tho Secret ~"l'\'ice. there
also existed 0 more widespread terror orgonizution
stalJlished bv tho Comintf\rn. whose mllin tf\.Sk it
was to dC8tr~y t lit' ships of thl> "tntos allied in the
ullti·Comintf'rn bloc.... The Communist sabot.age
groups in Hollanc.!. Uulgium. und Frunce weI'''
headed by tho j)ut(:h Communist Josof-Himbertus
• hmtp. who prosic.!ed over the "Jntertl,llb" in
Hotterc.!arn and maintainod tho (·Iospst possi.
hlo. relations with t he leaders of the Comillwl'n
organization in ·cundi.navia.
Th.is ambiguous attitude on the part of
tho Soviet Union led to tho outbreak of
the German-Soviet war.
\VffEN WA.R CAME
On June 22, 1941, tho crucial moment
had como when tho USSR bocame involved
in war. Now the development was to
take place "for the first time in the his-
tory f war" for which the Comintern
had worked for so many years: tho
milJion of supporters of Bolshevism were
t ri.o in the enemy countries,
But nothing of the kind happened.
In the Axi countrie: Communi m had
be n tamped out, partly by force but
mainly through the appeal of the superior
ideas of National-Socialism and Fascism.
Those states which had once boen the
most pronounced exponents of the Popular
Front in Europe, most of which had
at the same time been allied to the
Soviet Union, had undergone a thorough
change by the time tho war of Europe
a,gainst the Soviet Union broke out.
'zochoslovakia no longer existed. Most
of the former leaders of the Popular
Front in France were under arrest in
Ryon and were awaiting their trial. The
Red and "pink" functionaries of Spaill,
too, wore scattored between Marseilles
and :Mexico. Almost the entire con-
tinent of Europe was closed to Bolshevist
agitation. Hence Moscow was forced to
seek for othor companions with whom to
establish a new popular front that cor-
responded to the changed conditions.
This it did with its usual energy. In
particular, the Kremlin turned its at-
tontion toward the USA.
"The United Statcf-\ of America is the
wor"t enemy of the Soviet Union'-' the
first preside;lt of the Comintcl'll bad once
exclaimed. This was in the days when
America consistently refused to recognize
the Soviet Union, in the days when the
American Secretary (If ~tate, Kellogg,
f'tatcd on April 14, 1928, in a solemll
declaration:
Current dlwelopnwnts demonstrolf' tlto contillll<'f!
persi"tollce at Moscow of (I dominaLin~ worid-rev .
{lilltioll"r.v purpoRe unci tltl' prnetical rnru.ifesta-
lion of this purpose ill But·1t wuys a.~ rcndcr iln-
pOMsible t.he cstablishrnont of Llorrnul rolations
with tho Soviot GovcrnrnenL
In fact, the United States was the last
of the groat powers to recognize the Soviet
regime, not granting this reeogn.ition until
1933, after F. D. Hoosevelt became Pres-
ident. Under Roosovelt, Moscow's eHorts
fell upon fertile soil.
:KEW :FORC.ES Al\D SlTJ'PORTERS
The lead among the new sympathizers
of the Soviet lInion has heen takell by
Prc:,;ident Hoosevelt alld hi..,;; wife. Tho
First Lady of the OSA i.os busy giving alld
vi.siting tea parties to which numerous
students, delegates, and other representa-
tives of the Suviet stato aro invited, not
to mention the Red diplomacy. TIlls
indefatigable lady has also accepted
honorary presidencies and sponsorships
of all kinds of Marxist associations a.nd
organizations with many millions of
members.
President Roosevelt himself makes use
of every opportunity to express hi.s
sympathy and best wishes for his Hed
allies by participating personally in pro-
Soviet meetings or, if this is impossible,
by sonding telegrams. Moreover, he lots
deeds follow upon words. Thus it was
owing to his personal intervention that
the inhospitable gates of Atlanta jail
wore opened in order to give the American
Communist leader Earl Browder his full
liberty, and this three whole years oarl ier
than was provided for in the sentence he
was given for passport forgery. And
General Eisenhower received orders from
Roosevelt to the effect that all Com-
munists should immediately be released
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from prison in whatever parts of Africa
hi solclicr might oc'U py,
On the twenty-fifth a,nniver:ary of
the founding of tho 'oviet Unioll, Vice-
President Wallace of tbe Unitcd tates
declared that, a qlllLrter of a. 'clltllry
b fore the CommunistM had tarted an
oxporim 'nt "for the achievemont of hu-
man w ·lfare.' He all'o expressed tho
bope that t,ho CominterJl would complete
this ex lX1rirn nt after the succe. liful ter-
mination of the pre' 'nt war.
The memoer of Congress fartin Die,
who cun hardly oe accused of Fascist
loanings di"t'overcd 011 the ba,si::; of docu-
mont,1) tlmt, in the highest place of tho
Federal (:overnnH'nt in \Va hin 'Lon thcr
weI'· morll than 200 ofli ialH who wero
I' gistered members of the Communist
Party. lnited ~Lato" mdio tl'lLllfHnitters
repo~ted in October 11141 that approx-
imat,ly 100 (:o\"('l'I1l11ent oflit'illls had
b 'n onvicted of "lIon:rsive . mmunist
activities, Of theso oflicials, ,15 wero
em ploy 'd in tbe WI\r Departlll'nt and
40 in tho ~a\'y Department.
The prc.~, the radio, the IlIO ie', and
tho th 'atm-all adjusted therns ·Ives to
tho m:\I'lv awakened inter st in J3olshn-
vilim /lnl'l mlUlo eV\'ry effort to ati"fy
thi" thirst. fur kllO\\ \tori on the part of
the JJllldie. £\'I'n ill tho l' Army,
Lookl) on the tiov iut, l'lIiun arc HO mueh
ill demand t hat man v npw Ruv il:t works
hay b en tnuHdatl'c( IUld puIJlililll'd.
All door hitherto dosed to the Com-
munist.s nllW opened wide. A particularly
fortilo Hold of agitat.io!l arc tht millions
of underpri\'ilcged No rroes. Thl AFL,
th' brgl'st AmtriC'an labor uniun. which
had form( rly avoided all 'Outllet with
Communi:;t ~Jrganizations, Wl.lti ohliged to
agree to cullabomt· with th VI SH.
f d 'ratio!l l)f labor unions. Mr. Carrey,
bo" of thl' eI 'ctro-indu tr and radio
worker,,' union. Wllil expelled from ofRe
for submitting n. bill which condemned
not only Fuscism but also ·ommunism.
In return the Am rican Communists
now began to speak a differ nt language,
which culminated in tbe grotesque phrase,
ommuni 'm is twentieth-century Ameri-
canism."
"E~OLJL"D FALLS L~ LOVE
WITH SOVlJo:T R 'SSLo\."
These were the words with which the
Am ·riean weekly Life hara<:tcrizod the
pI' 'ent attitude in London. It ill a late
luve of old John l~ull, who in former
years had v ry clifI rent feelings for the
pro ent choico of his heart. We quote
only two xHmples, In 1919 no other
than the present Primo Minister of Eng-
land excll.Lillled :
The COll1ll1l1l1islS Ilro doing Hnt.u.n.ic c1oe<ls. Hun-
r1redH of thoUH/Llllls of p00l'lu aro heinK tortured t,o
dcal h wilh ('ultl-blooLiod "ruolt.y. Thill cannot. von
bu compnrcd wilh lho crupi pprs("culionll of Chri .
IIIIIIS ill IWIII-'. The Corrununi8 do nul I'\",'n (' .n,
OClnn pe01'1 to ocalh llll'y simply nHllulilalO
them.
HogaroloRs of this, the I"hor Goverruflont of our
counlr)' sIr t\'I,oll oul uolh hlUidB allo heartily
Illlllkc' lho 1.10 dlltlline<l II/melll.
Id spirit of proud AllJioll-whero or thou?
And in 1030:
ornmulliRm ill lik I) dillOllolle that approG<'hcll llo
weuken d or'lmism in ord r t.o d troy. \Vlmt
hcalth)' OrKWlI.Ilffi would b prepared lo undergo
lLIl cxperim nt with a dUic of that ILind'
This would I equivalent t.o keeping .. t rriblo
cobra in on 's house instNlu oC a lup do '.
L1Je r portl' that meUonwhile scarves
L '/,Iring t.l1O hammer and Bickle ha..... •
becolllo th late·t fA."ltiun in J.:lIg1;md,
lLntl that tho tioviut AmbasRlulor lul.H
been mado ltll hOllorary member of the
exclusive I::it ..Jame';'H Club.
Last y(:ar a. Lonin monumflnt wa,'1
80lcmruy ullveiled ill tho London district
of FilllllJlIl'y, the fin,t of its kind in
Europe outside of RUf.\sia. Tho BritiRh
Ministry (f Education i· working at a,
I' at ~Ian "for the deefX:ning of mutuul
understandin' betwlJClI Great Britain and
the U•.'::;H.," in tho eourse of whi h
8 >minari . have already been opened for
Engli:>h s 'ho lteachor: to tudy th S vi ,t
L'nion whil· work' by Lenin and Stalin
aI" being translated and pubLit:lhcd for
schoolchildren, and deputations of British
youth organizations I.Lud univerl>itics ar
being 'l:lllt to Mo ow.
The Briti 'h Communi t Party, whi h
a few years ago had to fight hard ant!
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often unsuccessfully for any percept,ible
iniluence on Briti"h policy, began to
harvo. t rich fruit. as soon as tho ofti('ial
alLianco wit.h ~loscow was pl'llclaimed.
Not only the raJio but alsu Reuter's
agency began to report in detail on all
measureR ILnd meet,ill~s of the ('rJllllnunist
Part. The Communil:it loader I'ollit was
v n able. in an addrc's over tho BBC,
to tell tho Briti:"h that it was tillH' fl)r
them tu Mtop only admiring tlH' ,'oviots
and that they should now try to follow
their example. The lift,ina of tho ban
on the Party or an. 'l'he Daify Iro'rker
a.nd 1'k Wee/.: contributed toward tho
g n raj trend. untie' Bobhevi."t pam-
phi t8 po ters, pictures, book', and
stlttl tics are flooding England and in-
orea 0 'Ollllllunist inllucnco on tho IllILt'HOS.
"Tr mendou sum uf money MO bcing
pen for ommunist purpo. es in En ·land.
and nob dy knowR whl,re the mono)" is
coming from," d> ·hu·ed the Labor Press
rvir. I1n organ of the British Labor
Party llrly in April. "When indulging
in h -ir propa anda acti\'ity, Communists
r lik bu'v be 'fl. They can he m I,
I' \Vh I' "in tho British armamcnt
iodu tr , and th ir inlluen • in Labor
oir I Ii incr MO from day to day," the
New hronicle add d Itt about the arne
time,
Exhibitions or anized by the oviet
Amb or a-rc ,Tj 'ted by tho highe t
offi 'nl and leading m mbers of 8 cioty.
The xtent to ",hi h the Anglican Church,
h adod by tho Ar hbHlop of Canterbury,
haa I t itself b drawn into th great
fl of propaganda is characterized by
a cilricature in th· ~etJJs Chrollirle: an
En Ii h I rgyman i shown kneeling be-
lor a crucifix on an altar decked with tha
flag of Moscow with it.. So,"ict. symuols uf
hamm I' and sickl .
The War Mini try permitted military
band to play th Jnt rnational .. whurovcr
thi wi ht appear dusirable or suitable."
Th Jeaders of tho BritiAh armed forces
wero facod by the tickliAh proulem, on
th ne hand, of llrou.-ing in tho mon a
friendly f oling towlLrd their Sovi t aUy.
a.nd on the other, of guarding thelll
Again t Communi t infiltrations. A p-
parentLy t.his lattcr intention WllS sacl'l-
flced, for early in ~11\.v th' British Min-
ister of \\'ar declarod in tho H OUAe of
CommnnM that soldiers in uniform were
allowed to attend Cumlllllnist mootinJ:{!'\.
Tht' t:HtabliAhmont uf Sovi('t conAlllates
Ilt nllnwrous places of the Briti"h Empire,
which Churchill had to concl·de, was im-
mediately ut,ilizl·d by ~l()"co\\" for purpo"cs
()f agitatiun, as bl'C'l\llle apparent frolll
tl)(} t'omplaintt:l maue hy Dr. Malan, the
SOllth African nlLtionl.lli,;t leader. It was'
also roeontly diHcovcl'(:d toat tuo tmn"fel-
of l'oli"h refugens frOUl the L S~H...ia.
Irun to Africa is heing w.,cU by tho ~Clvicts.
By putting a.gcnt.~ of their own among
the refugel~s, t,}wy huxu nHl.nngpu to get
thom intu ,VriclL.
rL_~YI~O "'ITIl FTltE
,'inc(' the former European t·itadtllt< of
Left.iRID have Ly 1I0W almost a.U tUrJIc<l
into tho oppo,.;ito, MOHCOW ha.d to look
for now batics among tho few f(·maining
neutral countric:;. Tho mo"t irnportllnt
for thill purposc' was Swedc·n. chiefly
bo 'uuse ::;wcdnn is tho only "tatn un the
Eurc,pt'an C:untilll'nt in which thn ('Olll-
munist Pa,rty Htill t'xi"tH IlIlU its publica.-
tions tltiU uppol.lr. Tho results of this
activity became apparent in tho lll.{;t
olection • held in autumn 194:! when the
Communi t doubled their vote!".
Tho SOD ational lure t of tho IIllLn,tger
of the Stockholm Intouri,.;t Hun'au
brought to light an oxtcn,.;in\ :-ioviet
espionago and prOpltganda organi7.ll.tion
in tho Swoilish ArIDY. :-)c)\iet propaganda
made skillful uso of ~\\'t'den'R 1I('lIt ralit,\'"
and pro!'lpored under the ambignollH a.t-
titudo of the (;O\"llrnlU(lnt.
Even in far-ofT lei land. whil'l-I had I.C:('.11
occupied by U:-iA forceH, the ('OIllllluual
elect.ion,.; in the capital ldso fl'fllllt<'d in 11
dou bling of t.he COlli III unist VOttl1l so t ha t
the ('ollll1luni"t I'urty became tho tlccun<!
lu.rgcst OIW in t.hl~t country.
At tlw very gatoA of SpaniAh Morocco
the Anglo-~axon invadel's of North Africa
reluaRod aU tho ~panjsh Redt:l hitherto in-
terned there. and the Americun ('om-
mander in Chief Genorul Eisenhower gave
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a solemn reception to the former Red
Spanish chief J uall Negrin, who had
arrived in Onm with American aid.
Thu, by the common effort of the
Anglo-American-Soviet allios, the ~panish
Popular Front of the civil war is being
1'o-e. tfLblHled on North African soil.
Even in •'outh America. incren-sing
symptoms of BolsheviZlttion are to be
found.
Tho Boishevi. t intel'llationalists have
tUI'I1 d aruund /lnd begun to appeal to
the national, patriotic feelings of the
various peoples. The main organ of the
·Cominl.ol'll. the K01n1nuni. titchesky Inter-
national. for example, wrot.o in its is ue
No. 'uf I!).! I :
In 011 counlriofl Lho Commullists ami Young
'Commlllli"ls "1'0 HL lhoir Hl(ht.ing pOSIt! in I he
pllt.ri ti" fronL of lihcrly of t.ho peOplC'll. The
Youn~ ('ollllnllni~IH uf .. 11 countries Hro lh(· most
loyal fi~htcrs for nat ionnl freedom .... In Frone'e
Lhe CtHlIllllU,isls Hnd Iho 8Uppol"l.Ors of Gouul'fIl de
Caullo 11I"'u olr(·ttd.v united I,h"i.' force" ill mUll)"
place. This is the 'orrecL pat.h.
Additional proof of this collaboration
of Do GauUe with the (;omrnuni-·ts was
recently providod by tho fact that De
Gaullo sont to to cow a.s hi diplomatic
repn'i<l'nt ti\-e Fcrnand Grenier a former
COllllllllnist deplIty. For the benefit of
the Balkan people.. , the Kremlin is mean-
",hil" \l'ILJ'lning lip the old Pun-Slavism.
WHY WAS 1'111-; CO:\!I]oITEIUi DISSOLVED~
Tho more l'illl'cessful the Communists
were at making lise uf thu war situation
in the count.ri'8 of the anti-A xi. camp
for thoir OWIl purposes, the more were
tho 0 people seized by anxiety who in
these cuuntrie ,in pitt: of war and prop-
aganda., had I' ,tll,ined their common
Rensu. They wunaore I whether this al-
liance with the USSR had not actually
brought, a "Trojall hoI'S·' with aU its
mortal danger into their mid ·t, the
sam' Trujan horse which tho Com-
iuterll len.dol' Dimitroff l'llcolllLllondcd so
cloq\l('nt,ly at the la t World ungrc'
a till' be·t method of infiltration. The
discovery of the Polish oliicors' bodies in
the fllru':-;t of J(lltyn must have opened
thc (,~rt'S of IlIltn)' to the menace of
Boblw\'i"m and must have recalled to
their minds the terrible list of Com-
munist outrages throughout the world
--during the rule of Bela Kun in
Hungary, during the Civil War in Spain,
l~t the tim of the Communi t regime in
Kiangsi, and in countle s other parts of
the globe. More and more people in
the Allied camp had to ask themselves:
"Are we doing tho right thing~"
The re ult wa that Roosevelt and
Churchill began to seek for means to
allay tho growing apprehensioll in their
own camp. Th best solutioll wa to
g t Stalin t,o make a great gesture. And
Stalin was willing. Aft.or the terrible
battles of tho wintor war, the Soviet
l/lion wa bleeding from many wounds,
was suffering from sta.rvation and a lack
of weapon;;, and needed more urgently
than evcr the reliof which a second front
would offer. In return for aid, fo cow
wa not averse to making tbi gr at
gesture in the form of the so-called dis-
solving of the Comintern,
STALJ.K co LD AFFORD IT
Stalin was all the morc able to afford
this sine Bolshevism had for many y aI'S
be n setting up parallel organizations
which, lik the Comintcrn, embraced the
revolutionary movoments of the world,
nnd which were not af'fectcd by the
di~solutioll. Among theso are:
The T'rufinlern (lnl('rnotionul of Profo&lioual
Uniull~. i.e., tmde lInion~)
The Cu,nllllulist 'Vornen's In Lornational
The ?lIOPR (International Organization for the
Aid of Workers)
The VOKS (Society for Culturo.l ConnootiollB
with Abroad)
The Lengue of tbe :Friends of the Soviet Union
The International League of Proletarian Athoists
In addition, Moscow had in the course
of the In. t fow y ars found an entirely
/lCW and promising weapon through the
C tablishment of Communist "govern-
ments' which wero maintained in t.he
•'o\riet Union, out ide of the countries
"governed' by them, and wore recognized
by Moscow. Among these were the
Finni::;h "govornment" of KUllsinen and
the "govel'uments' of other Baltic, tat.os.
At pro ent the Kremlin eern to be
headi.ng for the creation of a Polish and
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a Yugoslavian "government" on SO'Tiet
soil. These maneuvers have given Stalin
entirely new possibilities, quite independ-
ent of the Comintern, of interfering in
foreign nations.
Thus the publication of tho proposal
for dissolving the Comintern came about
on May 22. This document is :signod by
the members of the presiding council of
the EKKI. How tremendollsl v the world
has changed in the last few y~ars can be
seen from tho fact that, with the excep-
tion of the Soviet Union, in nono of the
countries represented in the presiding
council, such a· Germany, France, Italy,
Finland, Rumania, etc., do there still
exi t Communi t Parties as political reali-
tie.
THE COKSEQUEXCES
In the eyes of keen observers this
dissolution entails a loss of face for Stalin.
It shows that his position today is so
bad that he is forced formally to give up
one of the most important instruments of
\Yodd Revolution. However, the dis-
solution does not mean any loss of actual
power for him.
The Comilltern had two main tasks
to perform: on the olle hand, to
prepare tho World Revol ution by
creatiner the '·revolutionary atmos-
phere," and on the other, t~ keep the
Allies at war against the anti-Bolshevist
Axis po\vers. A.s to the first task, the
present war itseli is working largely
toward it. For under the influence of
the war-its deprivations and hardships,
its chaos in the field of prices and wages,
its destruction of the customary social
and economic structl1l:c-cli..content with
existing conclitions, in other words the
"revolutionar.v atmosphere," i.. growing
in the Allied countries. And as for the
second task. the Communist Parties are,
even without any formal connection with
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Moscow, still as capable of ca.rrying this
out as they were before May 22. The
cxample of the USA has shown this.
The Communist Party of the USA
resigned from the Comil;tern in 1U-!O in
order to avoid possible dissolution on
account of un-American activitic , against
which laws werc then boing passed in
Washington. No special significance was
attached to this resignation at the time,
and even careful new paper readers hardly
remembcr it today. In pite of thi tep,
the Communi 1. Party of the USA con-
tinued to work tirelessly for 1\10. cow's
aims.
This goes t·o show how little it
matters whether a Communist Party
belongs to the Comintern or not as long
as it represents the spirit of )10 cow.
'We cannot truiit the temporary change
of tactics of the rcvol utionaries," tho
Journal de (Jeneve 'tated on )fay 30,
whcn announcing that the Swiss Com-
munist Party would remain banned in
spite of the disbandment of the Comiuterll,
"for the only thing we know is that the
final aims of the Reds have not changed."
The British Labor Party ha,'! taken the
same skeptical attitude. In the motion,
refusing a merger of the Labor and Com-
munist Part,ies and adopted by a majority
of 17: 2 on May 28, the Executive Com-
mittee of the Labor Party stated:
The dissolution of the Comintern is uv no
means tsntnmount to the dropping of ~\'orlJ
revolutionary nims.
The fact that the so-called dissolving
of the Comintern represent:, not a change
in Bolshevi rn, but solely a change in
its methods, is cven admitted in tho
statement of the presiding council of the
EKKI published on May 22; and we
cannot conclude our survoy bettcr than
with the following quotation from it,
which clearly proves thc opportunistic-
character of the dissolution:
"The Communists always subordinated
the methods of work to the political in-
terests of the Labor movement in gcneral,
to the specific historical conditions, and to
the tasks dictated by existing conditions.'
'Gne Words of 'Gwo &xperls
"'V are sometimes accused of changing our Communist prin-
ciples. What st.upirlity and blindncs! We would not be .Marxist
revolut.ionaries, Lenini. ts, 1101. the pupils of Marx, Engels, Lenin,
and Stalin, were we not able completely to alter our tactics and
our action' according to circumstances. But all the detours of our
tactics lead to only one goal: '\Torld HevolutioD !"
Dimitroff. ",ecretary General of th.e Cominlern.
(/t the Sevculh IVo<rld C0l1greJJ8 in 1935
(,"tcl1oyrup!tic l'ecord, p. 1846).
"Britain and the United States cannot destroy Europe by
Bolshe\-ism, but their own peoples will sooner or later succumb
to this world pest."
Chullcel/or Hitler
i It h1'8 proclamarion oj J ul1uanJ 1, 1943.
